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BOOK REVIEW
JUDGMENT IN BERLIN. By Herbert J. Stern. New York, N.Y.: Uni-
verse. 1984. Pp. 384. Hardbound. $15.95.
Reviewed by The Hon. Gerard J. Kettmann*
Judgment In Berlin is a fast-moving true story that proves the
old adage that "truth is stranger than fiction." As events unfold
through the pages, the title takes ominous implications that may
shock some people and should concern all. What develops is a con-
flict between the legitimate interest of the state in honoring its inter-
national treaty commitments on the one hand, and the fundamental
civil rights of individuals on the other.
The book is of many stories all beginning with the yearnings of
two East Germans desperate to emigrate to the West. Their freedom
to leave East Germany was denied by the communist government
and was blocked by "The Wall of Tears." The Wall, erected on
August 13, 1961, divides Berlin into "East" and "West." This very
human and dramatic story is about their lives in East Germany,
their futile efforts, legal and illegal, to leave East Germany, and the
tragedy of the woman's West German lover caught in the East for
aiding her escape to the West.
On August 30, 1978, the man, the woman and the woman's
twelve-year-old daughter, fleeing from the communist secret police,
hijacked a Polish airliner and caused it to land at Tempelhof Airport
in the United States sector of West Berlin. Upon landing, the hijack-
ers were welcomed with opened arms by the American authorities.
The hijacking, however, soon became an international issue. Within
hours, the communists reminded the western powers of their recent
hijacking agreement to which both the United States and West Ger-
many were signatories.1 These treaties had been sought by the west-
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1. The hijacking came less than six weeks after leaders of the world's major non-com-
munist countries, including President Carter, resolved . . . to take steps against international
air piracy and to suspend air traffic to and from countries that fail to hand over hijackers and
hijacked airplanes quickly. That agreement contained no clause dealing with hijackers fleeing
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ern powers to protect their civil aviation from hijacking by terrorists
to the East. But now the situation was reversed, for under the trea-
ties the hijackers had to be prosecuted or extradited. The West
Germans did not want the job; therefore, the United States reluc-
tantly agreed to prosecute. Within two days after the plane landed,
the State Department had appointed a prosecuting attorney.
Once it was established that the hijackers were to stand trial, it
was necessary to have a court. The United States presence in West
Berlin was, at this time, justified "by right of conquest." In 1955,
the United States Court for Berlin had been created by High Com-
mission Law No. 46. By this law, a judge is appointed by and serves
at the pleasure of the United States Ambassador to West Germany.
For nearly twenty-five years the court existed on paper only. There
had never been a United States judge for Berlin. The German au-
thorities routinely handled all criminal cases in German courts that
sit throughout the City. Therefore, after the hijacking, it was also
essential that a presiding judge be found. The State Department ap-
pointed one, but within forty-eight hours after his arrival on Novem-
ber 27, 1978, he resigned without explanation. Another filled the
position temporarily until the Honorable Herbert J. Stern of the
United States District Court for New Jersey was appointed. This
book was written by Judge Stern.
During all this time, the three East Germans languished in con-
finement under "protective custody," without either charges, bail or
a lawyer. They knew nothing of the court being established or of the
four United States attorneys who stood ready to prosecute them. Be-
cause the crew of the Polish airliner had not observed that the wo-
man participated in the hijacking, there was no evidence upon which
to hold her. She received frequent friendly visits from the United
States chief investigator who used intrigue in the hope that she
would make an incriminating statement. She and her daughter were
finally released on November 3, 1978, but were not permitted to
leave West Berlin. The man was not released. Not until ninety-eight
days after the hijacking incident was a formal accusation brought
against him-followed by an accusation against the woman. Each
was then provided with three defense attorneys.
Judge Stern soon learned what the prosecution's intent was. In
early March, 1979, he was stunned by the State Department's posi-
tion that the United States' authority in Berlin was derived from the
from authoritarian countries to seek a haven in the West.
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rights of conquest under the Law of War and not from the consent
of the governed, that the United States Constitution did not apply,
and that everyone in West Berlin was subject to the total discretion
of the American occupiers. Consequently, Judge Stern was not an
independent judicial officer, but an instrument of foreign policy who
was to decide the guilt or innocence of the defendants according to
instructions. The defendants had no rights except those the State De-
partment gave them. In effect, the defendants had no greater protec-
tions than if they were to be tried by the communists behind "The
Wall of Tears."
The defense attorneys argued that the United States Constitu-
tion applied and that the defendants were entitled to its protections.
Under the separation of powers doctrine,2 a United States court is
separate and independent of the Executive Branch and cannot be
directed. The attorneys demanded a trial by jury, a jury composed of
West Berliners. Eventually, there was such a trial which is discussed
in the book.
How Judge Stern handled these issues during the pre-trial pro-
ceedings and during the trial makes this a strikingly unique and
powerful drama. For this is also the story of a judge who fought to
maintain the independence of the judiciary and his own integrity
under great pressure. How he presides over the trial, his inner
thoughts, reflections, logic and methods of handling the issues and
problems; his inability at first to fathom a major defense issue, and
his self-doubts are all revealed to the reader. Additionally, this is a
story about the trial attorneys, both prosecuting and defense; about
their problems, concerns, methods and trial strategies. It should be
fascinating reading to any reader; it should be that and more to legal
scholars, lawyers and judges.
The story of the United States Court for Berlin, however, did
not end with the trial of the hijackers. Another action was filed by
East Berliners looking for a forum. The United States Army
planned to construct a housing project in a West Berlin public park
area. The residents objected. They filed suit in a German Court, but
the suit was dismissed because the United States would not permit
the German Court to exercise jurisdiction. The citizens filed another
suit in a United States Court in Washington, D.C. This case was
2. The prosecution contended that this court's jurisdiction came by virtue of military
conquest and those subject to its powers were not entitled to constitutional protections. See id.
at 95.
The defense mocked this contention at the opening of the trial noting the absurdity of
allowing the executive branch to determine the trial's outcome. See id. at 102-07.
1984]
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also dismissed upon the motion of the United States for lack of juris-
diction because it involved an issue of German law.
The last hope of the Berliners was the United States Court for
Berlin. They argued that the Americans cannot legally, under due
process requirements, deprive the people of Berlin access to all
courts.
The American answer was a letter to Judge Stern from the
United States Ambassador: The Judge was directed not to exercise
jurisdiction over the case. Judge Stern, however, refused to be so
directed, stating: "As long as that letter pends before the Court, I
can render no decision . . . . I put aside your suggestion that I
should simply decide in your favor without giving reasons." 3 The
letter was not withdrawn.
The following day Judge Stern's appointment as judge for the
United States Court for Berlin was terminated. The Germans never
had their day in court.
This book is a harsh indictment of the positions taken by the
State Department, and justifiably so. It is difficult to conceive of any
American lawyer raised and trained in the traditions of American
Constitutional law advocating these positions. But, they were di-
rected to do so. Therein lies the great danger.
The problems that confronted the State Department were obvi-
ous. How could it expect the communist bloc countries to prosecute
or return hijackers from the West if hijackers from the East to the
West were to be tried by a jury completely sympathetic with the
hijackers' cause. The civil rights of the accused were important, but
so was the protection of the world's civil aviation.
Justice Williams J. Brennan, Jr., said of this book: "It is must
reading." I agree.
"Gesagt ist Gesagt.""
3. Id. at 372.
4. ". . . a German colloquial phrase meaning that this is an understanding which may
never be broken." Id. at 138.
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